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LEYLAND BATHGATE- A COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL WILL 
ALEX SALMOND 
Introduction 
There is a view of current and recent economic events in Scotland 
which emanates from New St Andrews House and runs something as 
follows. Oil and electronics are growth areas but virtually every other part 
of industry, or at least manufacturing industry, is essentially non-viable. 
The argument continues that this process is inevitable and that nobody is to 
blame. It is, we are led to understand, the sweep of history, the post-
industrial society, and after a period of painful adjustment, employment 
will revive (at least to some extent) led by the service sector. 
Those who consider the above to be a rather clumsy 'straw man' and 
not a potted but reasonably accurate version of official thinking take one of 
the many opportunities to consider the economic views of the Conservative 
MP for Stirling, the man who asks not how many jobs have been lost but 
how many resources have been saved. It is true that Mr Forsyth differs from 
his Governmental colleagues in often appearing to regard the decline of 
manufacturing as a good thing to be encouraged, as opposed to an 
unfortunate circumstance which cannot be stopped, but essentially the 
proposition is the same and it's wrong for the same reasons. 
Oil and electronics are growth industries and will continue to develop 
even if expansion is not always at an even rate. However they do not hold 
the solution to Scottish unemployment. Indeed despite the huge expansion 
in output, the electronics sector employed rather more people in the early 
1970s than it does in the mid 1980s. Nor does the service sector provide a 
perfect substitute for manufacture, for the very good reason that only a 
small percentage of services are internationally tradeable. Ultimately we 
cannot all gather in each others' washing or (more to the point in this 
context) privatise each others' dustbins. 
A degree of scepticism about the ability of UK Governments to 
improve or manage the economy is understandable. However there should 
be little doubt about Government's ability to damage it. Scottish 
manufacturing strength in, say, quality engineering and textiles survived 
the recession despite not because of Government exchange rate 'policy' in 
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1979-81. In the service sector the most significant growth potential lies not 
in areas of newly discovered entrepreneurship but in traditional industries 
such as finance and tourism. However the industries which have been hit 
hardest certainly can look to economic policy for the root of their problems. 
For example the important construction sector has struggled with the 
disappearance of much of its public sector work not to mention real interest 
rates kept high enough to sustain sterling at levels which have rendered 
much of manufacturing uncompetitive. 
One sector of the Scottish economy which has contracted into a 'black 
hole' since 1979 is what can be termed the 'regional aid' economy. This 
consists of the factories and industries brought to Scotland by the active 
regional policies of successive governments in the 1960s. In the last five 
years from Invergordon to Linwood, the pillars of regional policy have 
fallen one by one, and the question is whether or not this has been a 
'natural' economic process, the result of a well-meaning but failed 
experiment. The case study below of the collapse of the British Leyland 
factory at Bathgate suggests, rather, that the explanation is not as 
straightforward, and lies in the realm of policy and politics as well as 
economics. 
Background 
The-then British Motor Corporation was sent to Bathgate in 1960 by 
the Macmillan Government and the plant was in production by October of 
the following year. The fact that this locational decision was forced on BMC 
was an irritation that senior management past and present never bothered 
to hide but, despite this inauspicious beginning, the plant proved to be a 
considerable success. The vehicles operation of what eventually 
consolidated into British Leyland was highly profitable throughout the 
1960s and 1970s and the Bathgate plant became the centre of operations in 
Leyland vehicles. From an initial2,000 the workforce expanded to 6,000 by 
1978 and by this time Leyland's Scottish operations at Bathgate and Albion 
were producing three-quarters of all Leyland trucks over 3'/, tonnes and 
generating an estimated 2 per cent of Scottish Gross Domestic Product. 
Indeed in 1976 Leyland revealed massive investment plans for the Bathgate 
factory with the lion's share of a cash injection from the Government going 
to the Scottish operations and the Bathgate workforce projected to more 
than double (to 13,000) by the mid 1980s<!). 
The plans were stillborn, and behind the facade of success, worrying 
trends were beginning to emerge both for the vehicles division as a whole 
and for Bathgate in particular. Firstly, there was substantial under-
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investment with the profits from the vehicles division effectively siphoned 
off to support the ailing car division. As a consequence over a period of 
twelve years up to 1980 Leyland did not release a single completely new 
truck onto the market. Against increasingly severe competition Leyland's 
UK market share began to slide as their staple volume models, the Boxer, 
the Terrier and the EA and FG vans reached the end of their product cycle. 
From a position of comfortable market leadership, with 30 per cent in 1974, 
Leyland was overtaken by Ford in 1977 in sales of trucks over 3'/z tonnes. By 
1980 the market share had declined to just over 17 per cent. 
TABLE 1 
UK Market for Trucks over 3.5 Tonnes 
Total Volume Market Share(%) 
Leyland Ford Bedford 
1974 58,573 29.4 20.7 19.3 
1975 57,274 26.3 25.2 19.4 
1976 57,322 23.2 21.7 22.5 
1977 61,486 22.8 23.3 18.8 
1978 70,448 19.3 23.8 18.3 
1979 79,856 17.3 21.4 18.8 
1980 61,300 17.3 23.5 16.0 
Source: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
To a great extent, the expanding home market for trucks in the late 
1970s masked the full complications of this deterioration, but a crisis 
developed when the UK market contracted sharply from 1979-81. This was 
followed by problems in the highly profitable overseas markets caused by 
sterling's rapid appreciation and then a collapse in demand as recession 
became general rather than specific to the UK. 
The second cause for concern was the position of the Bathgate factory 
within the Leyland combine. Indeed the key moment in Bathgate's decline 
goes as far back as 1978, pre-dating the contraction in the market. For in 
that year the-then BL Chairman, Michael Edwardes withdrew planned 
investment from the plant as a "punishment" for an unofficial industrial 
dispute. It was a decision which Edwardes later was to claim (in his 
autobiography) received the blessing of the-then Labour Prime Minister 
but one which had much more to do with general industrial strife in the 
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problem attached to Bathgate. Bathgate was penalised 'pour encourager 
les autres' despite a good record in productivity and costs, and a first class 
one in terms of profitability. In retrospect it is clear that this was the turning 
point for the factory. Leyland Vehicles began their belated model renewal 
programme, but the investment was centred not in Bathgate but in a new 
£32 million assembly hall at Leyland Lancashire. Indeed, of the £2.000 
million Government aid to BL since 1978 Leyland Vehicles share has been 
only £350 million of which Bathgate, the rna jor profit earner oft he previous 
decade, received no long term benefit. Plenty of new models were 
promised but none delivered. From 1978 onwards Bathgate's varied and 
successful product range was gradually eroded, transferred or privatised to 
other plants. In the last five years Leyland's only major investment in 
Bathgate has been in redundancy money. 
The cab operation was first to go. A new cab- code named C40L- was 
to be produced at Bathgate for the high volume medium weight trucks in 
the new model range. However in 1980 Leyland's private sector supplier for 
other cabs in the range, Motor Panels of Coventry, developed severe 
financial problems and, in order to protect the full range, the production of 
Bathgate new cabs was sent to Coventry. Bathgate shop stewards claim that 
this was done despite the management acknowledging that the Bathgate 
plant could produce the cabs at lower costs than the outside supplier. As 
compensation for the loss of cab making, which had been a Bathgate 
responsibility since 1969, the shop stewards were promised a new panel van 
to replace the popular but ageing, EA and FG bakery and post office vans. 
There were also assurances that Bathgate would receive the new volume 
model, the MT 211 replacement<2l for the Bathgate built Terrier and a new 
engine for both the light trucks and tractors. 
However, far from confirming Bathgate as a key factory, the 
company's 1981/82 restructuring proposals pushed the factory to the 
margin of Leyland's operations. Lancashire was to assemble all the volume 
models, including the MT 211, the new tractor developed and launched 
from Bathgate in record time was privatised to Marshall Sons of 
Gainsborough, and van production was to be centred at Freight Rover in 
Birmingham. When shopfloor resistance to the Corporate Plan failed in 
early 1982 the extent of Bathgate's decline was clear. In the space of three 
years the plant had been transformed from the key factory in Leyland 
Vehicles to a peripheral plant whose functions were the production of old 
models which were being phased out and the supply of components for the 
new model range. Even before the 1982 Corporate Plan, the leaders of the 
Bathgate workforce had seen the danger very clearly as the diagram below 
taken from a shop stewards' paper of 1981 illustrates. 
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TRUCKS - PRODUCED AT BATHGATE 
1982-? 
FIGURE 1 
Source: Leyland Vehicles Bathgate Jt Shop Stewards' Committee 1981 
After Leyland successfully implemented their plan there was little 
doubt in the minds of the workforce where events were leading despite the 
reassuring noises being made by the company and the local MP. The views 
of the former AUEW Sub-Convener at the factory were typical in 1982. 
"I fear the worst for the Bathgate plant. The trends in Leyland are 
clearly established. Not only are they moving out of manufacturing 
into putting a Leyland badge on a mechanic set of bought parts, they 
are also moving out of Scotland to rationalise in the Midlands. I 
desperately hope I am wrong but I think we are about stage 990 in the 
death of a thousand cuts and there are probably only a few more 
broken promises to go before closure. "(3) 
Leyland management, of course, did not present things that way. 
Bathgate, it was claimed, was to be the 'world engine centre' and the base 
for the specialist export models. The T43 Landtrain was moved North from 
the doomed Guys plant at Wolverhampton as proof of Bathgate's 
prominent position in future plans. In the Autumn of 1982, amid a publicity 
fanfare, the company launched a collaborative agreement with Cummins, 
whereby Bathgate would produce, under licence, the USA giant's 'world 
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series' engine. 
Unfortunately it was already clear in 1982 that being the group's 
specialist export centre was a dubious privilege; in the short term because 
Third World markets were moving into steep recession and in the medium 
term because that market is limited by the understandable desire of 
developing countries to assemble their own vehicles. In addition while the 
Cummins engine deal had some attractions for Bathgate it, at best, gave the 
plant a future not as a volume truck plant employing many thousands but as 
a component factory producing somebody else's engines with perhaps 
1,500 workers. 
The rest is fairly recent history. Although Leyland were still issuing 
public commitments on the plant's future in August 1983(4) the countdown 
towards closure had already started. The Cummins investment was frozen 
in December of the same year, with only a small fraction of it committed, 
pending "a review of the company's operations". In May 1984 the 
Government approved BL's Corporate Plan which included the closure 
announcement for Bathgate with the revelation that the 'world engine' 
would be bought from one of Cummins' own plants at Darlington. 
The shop stewards attempted to rally the demoralised workforce 
playing their final card of control of the components for the MT 211, the 
new volume truck once promised to Bathgate but destined for Lancashire 
and described by Ron Hancock, (S) the-then Chairman of Leyland Vehicles 
as "as important to Leyland as the Metro was to Austin Rover". However, 
a combination of the carrot (in the shape of a possible bid from Track 
Marshall for the existing engine line) and the stick (in the shape of a threat 
to enhanced redundancy payments) secured a return to work after a few 
days of factory occupation. The Roadrunner was duly launched in 
September 1984 and in June 1985, Charles Nickerson of Marshall Sons 
announced that this bid for the Bathgate engine facility was not, after all, a 
commercial proposition. 
At the time of writing, Leyland, to the workforce's dismay, are set on 
selling the vast bulk of the plant for retail rather than industrial 
development. Final closure is scheduled for the Summer of 1986 with a 
1,200 workforce producing the old truck range until January 1986 and 
subsequently reduced numbers continuing with engine production until the 
Summer. 
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Analysis 
Three explanations have been advanced to explain the decline and fall 
of the Bathgate factory. The first is the Ley land/Scottish Office version that 
recession at home and particularly abroad is responsible. The second 
theory, which is widely accepted among economists, is that the failure of 
Bathgate is but one more example of the general failure of regional policy in 
'grafting' industries into an unreceptive host economy. The third 
explanation is one which points an accusing finger straight at Leyland 
management. It asserts that, on any reasonable interpretation of company 
decisions since 1978, the Bathgate closure is not essentially a short-term 
reaction to adverse trading conditions but rather the result of a medium-
term decision to marginalise the plant. 
According to the first theory, then, the markets for Bathgate products 
simply vanished. The Scottish Office, in particular, favoured a 
concentration on the collapse of the Nigerian market presumably on the 
grounds that they could hardly be blamed for Nigerian economic problems. 
The Secretary of State's first comment on the 1984 crisis set the tone for 
what was to follow in the way of official comment. 
"No announcement is being made about Leyland Trucks' plant at 
Bathgate, where I regret to say that, in spite of hard work and co-
operation by the labour force in improving productivity, the 
problems facing the company are particularly severe due to the 
virtual collapse of the export demand for the products made 
there."<6l 
This line of argument has been echoed, parrot-like, in virtually every 
Government and Leyland statement on the closure and it barely stops short 
of misrepresentation. Nigerian demand for Bathgate heavy trucks had 
indeed virtually dried up but that was hardly the cause of the plant's 
difficulties. In the late 1970s Leyland Bathgate had been exporting its 
varied truck range to over 70 countries. By 1984 this product range had 
been effectively reduced to two specialist models, one of which had been 
produced at Bathgate for little more than a year. It takes a remarkable 
brand of logic to make a factory an export truck centre in 1982, reduce its 
model range to a dependence on a limited market and then explain its 
demise a few months later on the basis that these markets had collapsed! 
There is no question however that declines in market size and in 
market share have dictated many of the decisions made by Leyland 
Vehicle's management. They claim that the Lancashire plant can cope 
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comfortably with any forseeable demand for their trucks. 
"The basic problem is that we have too much assembly capacity. 
Bathgate and the Leyland (i.e. Leyland, Lancashire) Assembly Plant 
could built more trucks than the entire number sold in Britain last 
year."(?) 
Although strongly disputed by the shop stewards the management 
argument that Lancashire now has the capacity to meet future demand 
seems credible even if it does reveal the extent to which the company has 
lowered its ambitions in terms of being a major vehicles manufacturer. On 
single shift, Lancashire can assemble over 10,000 trucks every half-year 
and, on double shift, perhaps 20,000. This compares with a total Leyland 
output of 8,219 in the first six months of 1985, in itself an impressive 37 per 
cent increase over 1984levels. 
However, in terms of providing the explanation for the Bathgate 
closure these figures beg the question. The expanded Lancashire facility 
did not appear from nowhere but opened straight into short time working in 
June 1980. The real question is- was there a management decision then or 
before to fill the new Lancashire plant by emptying Bathgate? If so, the 
final decision to close Bathgate has got little to do with the market demand 
conditions prevailing in 1983/84 and a great deal to do with prior company 
strategy as to the geographical location of supply. 
The second explanation for the decline of the Bathgate factory is that 
its inability to withstand the recession is just another indictment of the 
active regional policy which brought BMC to Scotland in the first place. 
Given the extent of the failures in the 'showpiece' projects of regional 
policy it is understandable, if somewhat sloppy, reasoning to assume that 
the policy itself has failed, that direction of company location decisions 
builds nothing more than 'cathedrals in the desert'. No doubt there is 
something in this argument but it would be unwise to assume that the 
economics of the Invergordon smelter, the Corpach pulp mill, the Linwood 
car factory, the Ravenscraig integrated steel complex and the Bathgate 
truck plant are identical or even at all similar. 
One common problem all these plants did face was not just economic 
recession but an effective reversal of regional policy. This is more than just 
a matter of the major erosion in the value of financial assistance to the 
company sector although this is, in itself, significant. What it is reasonable 
to suppose is that the reduction in expenditure reflects a reduction in 
commitment to regional growth and that this is a factor which will be taken 
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into account when a nationalised company such as 
considers what proposals in its Corporate Plan are 
acceptable to the Cabinet in terms of public policy. (SJ 
British Leyland 
likely to prove 
No doubt the Bathgate factory would have been in a stronger position 
if there had been established a stronger infrastructure of suppliers at local 
level and there was a heavy irony in Leyland's attempts in 1982, 20 years 
after establishing the factory and a year before closing it, to interest local 
companies in the possibilities of supplying the Bathgate plant. However it is 
by no means clear that its location was any great disadvantage in 20 years of 
operation. For the vast majority of this period it was an extremely 
profitable operation, subsidising other parts of British Leyland but after 
1978 receiving little investment. Even over the new Lancashire assembly 
plant Bathgate had sustained advantages. At peak volumes cab 
manufacture was the most efficient in the UK while Leyland describe the 
Bathgate machine shop as "one of the best equipped in Europe". <9> In 
addition the Bathgate factory was flexible with the capability of running 
model mixers for 31/z- 32 tonnes. The Lancashire facility, in contrast, is 
inflexible, designed for large runs and still sends its cabs back and forward 
to Coventry to be first fitted and then painted. Even the Government do 
not consistently claim that Bathgate was an unsuitable location. 
"I would like to underline the fact that I do not accept the suggestions 
made by some hon.members that the decision to close Bathgate 
demonstrates that the British Motor Corporation should never have 
come to Scotland ...... the real story is more complex and the plant 
has experienced good times as well as bad". (JO) 
The move from Bathgate was part of Leyland Vehicles' move away 
from integrated manufacture i.e. having the ability to develop every 
component in-house. This in turn has been dictated by Leyland's low 
volumes (in world terms) and the lack of investment which would have 
made possible independent product development. This point is generally 
agreed among industry commentators. 
"Generous state funding supports Renault Industrial Vehicle's £500 
million investment on developing a family of just four diesel engines 
but between 1975-83 Leyland Vehicles were allocated £350 million to 
finance everything - new plant, vehicles, components, research 
development and so on. In effect this meant that Leyland Vehicles 
could n.o longer operate as an integrated operation and had to 
become more an assembler of bought-in parts". (II) 
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Bathgate was an integrated operation while the new assembly hall in 
Lancashire is just that - a point to assemble cabs from Coventry, engines 
from Darlington, axles from Albion etc. Furthermore Leyland's strategy 
has been to out-source as much as possible of the meccano kit which now 
makes us their trucks. However, while these trends in Leyland did work 
against the Bathgate plant, they do not, of necessity, militate against 
Bathgate as a location. Indeed it can be argued that emphasis on volume 
component manufacture implies a trend towards geographical dispersion. 
Why should Bathgate be any more unsuitable a location for, say, engine 
manufacture than the Cummins' plant just down the road at Shotts in 
Lanarkshire? (In addition Volvo's tiny but highly successful plant at Irvine 
gives the lie to the idea that high volumes are a necessary condition for 
establishing a truck factory in Scotland). There is in fact little evidence that 
Bathgate's location was any sort of problem except perhaps in the minds of 
Leyland senior management. The plant was only a casualty of regional 
policy in the sense that it is inconceivable that the decision to close Bathgate 
would have been made at a time of active regional policy. 
The third explanation for the Bathgate closure- that it was the result of 
a management decision to marginalise the plant- is by its nature difficult to 
establish. It depends not just on events but on an interpretation of the 
motives of Leyland senior management. However it is a conclusion which 
has proved difficult to resist not just among the workforce (where it is 
universally accepted) but even for those who would not normally be 
predisposed to the argument that Leyland management had emptied a 
Scottish factory to fill English ones. In the House of Commons debate on 
the closure Robin Cook MP produced the following remarks. 
"Understandably there is now a considered view in my constituency-
and I have great sympathy with the interpretation- that what we are 
witnessing is the final stage in a long pre-arranged, pre-designed plan 
to close the Bathgate plant. "(12l 
It should be said that the local MP for the factory, Tam Dalyell, has 
never shared this view, refusing to believe even in early 1984 that the plant 
was in danger and vigorously attacking anyone who suggested the contrary. 
In May 1984 he acted virtually as a management accomplice in persuading 
the workforce to abandon their control of the factory and their bargaining 
power over MT 211 components on the flimsy basis of a preliminary interest 
from Marshall Sons. Events have since shown that Tam Dalyell's faith in 
both Leyland management and in Marshall Sons was seriously misplaced. 
Indeed since the June 85 announcement that Marshalls were no longer 
interested in taking over Bathgate the entire Marshalls Group has gone into 
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liquidation. Among the many questions which should be raised about the 
realism of the supposed Marshall Sons' bid is the issue of how a group with a 
total turnover of less that £20 million, and no background of engine 
manufacture, ever could be seriously considered as owners of a complex on 
the scale of Bathgate. However both Leyland and Tam Dalyell were keen 
to present it in that light when the Bathgate workforce were occupying the 
plant. Mr Dalyell's intervention without question was influencial in the 
workforces narrow decision, against the advice of their shop stewards, to 
leave the factory and abandon their hold on components for the MT211 
with no guarantees as to the future. I do not doubt Mr Dalyell's sincerity but 
that does not excuse the fact that an M.P. whose Parliamentary carrer 
extends through the lifespan of the Bathgate factory produced, on this 
issue, a political performance which would embarrass a Parliamentary 
novice. (!3) 
Despite Tam Dalyell's belief that there was no corporate policy to pull 
out of Bathgate there is strong evidence that it was corporate policy to at 
least push Bathgate to the margin of Leyland Vehicles' operations. 
In the late 1970s Leyland invested £32 million in the new assembly hall 
m Lancashire, a small investment in motoring industry terms but an 
extremely large one for Leyland Vehicles. This brought Lancashire 
capacity on single shift to well over 20,000 and a double shift to around 
40,000 trucks a year, more than enough to cope with Leyland output even in 
the boom year of 1978. Therefore, even allowing for a large dose of 
optimism about market share and size and making the reasonable 
assumption that the company intended to run their new plant at near full 
capacity, we can deduce the following two points as having been part of 
company strategy. 
Firstly, that Leyland Lancashire was to supplant Bathgate as the key 
truck plant in the group. The series of decisions which saw the model 
replacements for Bathgate's ageing truck range move to Lancashire were 
therefore pre-planned and the commitments made to the Bathgate 
workforce about new models were either the result of management 
incompetence or deceit. 
Secondly, if Bathgate had any future in company planning after the 
late 1970s, it was as a component factory supplying engines and perhaps 
cabs to the other plants. It is possible that the privatisation of the cab 
operation and the final decision to halt the Cummins'. engine deal were 
short-term reactions to crisis situations. However, Bathgate became 
vulnerable to such situations because of the earlier management decisions. 
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It was the decision to remove Bathgate from the centre of Leyland Vehicles 
operation which made rundown inevitable and,. in adverse market 
conditions, closure a possibility. 
It could be argued that this interpretation is too kind to the company 
and that all the assurances given on Bathgate's future were made in bad 
faith, designed to achieve a smooth transfer of Bathgate components and 
models to other factories. Certainly in many cases the sequence of events 
looks extremely suspicious. For example, the final decision to withdraw 
from the Cummins engine deal is difficult to reconcile with the information 
contained in Leyland's Corporate Plan. 
The deal was signed in September 1982. Bathgate was to produce, 
under licence the Cummins' 'family one' engine for Leyland Trucks and for 
export in addition to supplying components for the US market. The 
following August the-then Leyland Vehicle's Chairman<14l gave a further 
assurance on the commitment to the joint venture. However in December, 
after months of rum our, Leyland froze the investment after spending only a 
fraction of the promised £30 million. Assuming that Mr Hancock was 
telling the truth in August 1983 this means that Leyland must have reversed 
their decision to invest at some time in the Autumn of that year presumably 
while preparing their 1984 Corporate Plan. What had happened between 
September 1982 and one year later to provoke such a dramatic reversal of 
policy? The UK market had recovered by 10 per cent and the Leyland share 
had responded with the hope offurther gains to come. Industry forecasters 
were considerably more hopeful about market prospects in late 1983 than 
they had been a year before. Most significantly of all, the competitive 
position of the UK had improved substantially thanks to the depreciation of 
sterling, an improvement which had not been foreseen by Leyland, who 
had assumed a sterling trade weighted index of 90 against an outrun of 83 
for the year.<15l Under this combination of circumstances it seems 
inconceivable that Leyland could have revised downwards a demand 
projection over the year from September 1982 and a deal judged viable 
then should still have been viable in the Autumn of 1983 with market forces 
moving heavily in its favour. 
Two final points make the waters murkier yet. First, in December 
1983, Cummins at first denied any knowledge of Leyland's decision to 
freeze investment in the project although the Bathgate stewards had been 
concerned about the sluggish progress in the joint venture since the middle 
of the year. Secondly, when announcing the closure of Bathgate in May 
1984, the Leyland Vehicle's Managing Director revealed that "initial 
discussions show that we can now buy these engines from Cummins cheaper 
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than we could make them." A company management which signs a joint 
venture agreement in September 1982 but twenty months later is still at the 
stage of "initial discussions" with its partner on costings invites serious 
questions as to its competence or veracity, or both. 
Conclusion 
The above analysis suggests a number of conclusions. Firstly, the 
concentration on the export and Nigerian market collapse as an 
explanation for Bathgate's demise is inadequate. It was a contributory 
factor to Leyland's global problems but is not in any sense a satisfactory 
explanation for the Bathgate closure in particular. It provided a fig leaf for 
the company and the Government to escape responsibility for the closure. 
Secondly, the view that Bathgate is just another 'lame duck' of 
regional policy ignores the successful performance of the plant for most of 
its lifespan and the continuing success of similar, albeit smaller, engine and 
vehicle plants in Scotland. Significantly, even the Government has not 
attempted to argue that Bathgate was unsuitable as a location. There is 
little evidence that Bathgate's cost structure was inferior to any other 
location in the Leyland combine. 
Thirdly, the closure was certainly the result of company strategy in the 
sense that the company determined in the late 1970s to replace Bathgate as 
a key plant in Leyland Vehicles. Whether or not closure was envisaged at 
that time is open to question, but it was this management decision which 
made the rundown of the plant inevitable and, in the exceptionally poor 
trading conditions of the early 1980s, that same decision made closure 
possible. 
It could be argued that this conclusion is less than dramatic. After all in 
its period of retrenchment, Leyland has closed other plants and would a 
decision to close Lancashire and concentrate on Bathgate have been any 
more defensible? In answer there are the obvious replies that, in the late 
1970s Bathgate was in possession of the key elements in the existing truck 
range and therefore the decision to produce the replacement models in 
Lancashire was at the expense of the Scottish factory. In addition the 
Scottish Division of Leyland had been one of the chief crutches for the 
Midland car division in the 1970s. It would have been equitable for the 
positions to be reversed for a short period in the 1980s. Two more points 
should be made. Firstly, Leyland Vehicles is part of a public company, 
albeit one under instructions to return to the private sector. The taxpayer, 
who has subsidised its operations, and the Bathgate workforce who 
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generated the profits which helped fund the model renewal programme in 
the car division were entitled to expect a certain standard of propriety in the 
company's behaviour. This was hardly forthcoming. The workforce were 
constantly misled on the company's plans for the factory while the public 
are still being misled on the reasons for closure. 
The second and final observation raises the question of public policy 
BMC came to Scotland as part of an explicit policy operating on the 
company sector. British Leyland have left Bathgate as part of an implicit 
policy pursued by a public company and accepted by the Government. The 
Government has conceded, even boasted, that regional policy is no longer 
to be pursued on anything like the same scale as previously. The story of 
Bathgate indicates rather more, namely that conscious managerial and 
political decisions are being sheltered behind a cloak of market forces and 
'natural' economic change. The regional policy gear is not in neutral but in 
reverse. 
Alex Salmond is an economist working in the financial sector. 
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